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Credit Cards: Weapons for Domestic Violence 
CHRISTINE KIM*  
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, Nicole Brown Simpson was brutally murdered.1 Images 
of O.J. Simpson’s criminal trial became ingrained in popular culture,2 but the 
long history of domestic abuse that O.J. Simpson inflicted upon Nicole has 
largely been forgotten by today’s collective consciousness.3 Police were called to 
intervene during domestic disputes on nine occasions during the years prior to 
her killing.4 Even the prosecution minimized the abuse as the trial progressed.5 
As the prosecution predicted, jurors could not grasp why domestic abuse was 
relevant to her death.6 One juror asked, “What did all the talk about domestic 
abuse have to do with homicide?”7 
The trial helped educate the public about the link between domestic 
violence and homicide.8 But even with this national awakening and Congress’ 
immediate passage of federal legislation and funding for domestic violence 
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 1.  Nancy Dillon, Revisiting the O.J. Simpson Trial, 20 years After the Infamous Bronco Chase, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Jun. 8, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ revisiting-o-
simpson-trial-20 -years-article-1.1821355. 
 2.  See id. (citing the imagery of the ill-fitting leather gloves to the white Bronco).  
 3.  See e.g., O.J. Simpson Murder Case, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_of_the_ 
State_of_California_vs._Orenthal_James_Simpson (mentioning domestic abuse in 1989 but not prior 
incidents) (last updated Jan 22, 2014). 
 4.  Josh Meyer, Police Records Detail 1989 Beating That Led to Charge: Violence: A Bloodied Nicole 
Simpson, Hiding in Bushes After 911 Call, Told Officers: 'He's going to kill me.' Judge Overruled Prosecutors' 
Request that Simpson Serve Jail Time, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-06-
17/news/mn-5290_1_jail-time. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909-10 (1996) (noting the critical response to 
Nicole Brown Simpson’s murder).  
 5.  EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 3 (2007).   
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. See ETHEL KLEIN ET AL., ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CHANGING PUBLIC 
PERCEPTIONS/HALTING THE EPIDEMIC 8–9, 95–96 (1997) (explaining that trial was “a national ‘teach-in’ 
on the issue of domestic violence,” and one year later, poll participants said domestic violence was an 
extremely important problem). Some argue that, while the trial showed the connection between 
murder and domestic violence, the O.J. Simpson trial obscured the underlying issues of domestic 
violence. See e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in 
Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (1998) (arguing politicization of O.J. trials around race 
caused public to see domestic violence as a white woman’s problem); Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist" 
Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583, 603–04 (2012) 
(stating domestic violence movement took “oversimplified” view of issue as “innocent, non-poor, 
white women”). 
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prevention,9 the prevalence of domestic violence remains staggeringly high.10 
Just as the nation was asked to redefine domestic violence as a criminal act with 
deadly consequences, our conception of domestic violence must continue to 
evolve as research uncovers the factors intrinsic to violent relationships and the 
new weapons abusers yield to harm their victims.11 
One new weapon abusers are increasingly exploiting is debt.12 Angela 
Littwin’s groundbreaking research into domestic violence and credit lead to the 
identification of a more specific form of domestic violence abuse: coerced debt.13 
Coerced debt is defined as “all nonconsensual, credit-related transactions that 
occur in a violent relationship, not just matters that depend on the express 
application of force.”14 Examples of coerced debt include “abusers taking out 
credit cards in their partners’ names without their knowledge, forcing victims to 
obtain loans for the abuser, [and] tricking victims into signing quitclaim deeds 
for the family home.”15 Although debt is not a recent invention,16 over the past 
twenty years, credit cards and other consumer products have become easier to 
obtain, making coerced debt a more viable instrument for abusers.17 
Today, credit cards are ubiquitous.18 Credit card issuers have found it 
 
 9.  Within months of Nicole’s murder, the Violence Against Women Act was passed as part of 
an omnibus bill. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat.1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 10.  The national lifetime prevalence of intimate partner physical violence is 31.5% among 
women. Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and 
Intimate Partner Violence Victimization — National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United 
States, 2011, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 9 (2014) [hereinafter Breiding, NIPSVS 2011], 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6308a1.htm. From 2003 to 2012, 
domestic violence comprised 21% of all nonfatal violent crime. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. 
MORGAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: NONFATAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2003-2012 1 
(2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf. In 2010, approximately 39% 
of female homicides were committed by an intimate partner. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF VICTIMIZATION, 1993-2011 3 
(2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvav9311.pdf.  
 11.  An example of new technologies used by abusers to stalk and manipulate victims include 
spyware and GPS tracking. Justine A. Dunlap, Intimate Terrorism and Technology: There's an App for 
That, 7 U. MASS. L. REV. 10, 21–23 (2012).  
 12.  Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CAL. L. 
REV. 951, 953 (2012) [hereinafter Littwin, Coerced Debt] (“As consumer lending has permeated 
American life, violent partners have begun using debt as a means of exercising abusive control, 
making the consumer credit system an unknowing party to domestic violence.”).  
 13.  Id. at 954.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See, e.g., Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of 
Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 555 (2008) (“The Athenians allowed transactions in credit to proceed 
unregulated. Although Athens became known for its sophisticated commercial credit market, it was 
infamous for the highest consumer interest rates in the ancient world at 9,000 percent.”). 
 17.  See Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit Cards, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 339, 353-54 (2011) (highlighting the “democratization of credit”); Angela Littwin, Beyond 
Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 453 
(2008) [hereinafter Littwin, Beyond Usury] (noting the adverse effects of available credit for low-
income families).  
 18.  Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 557, 583 (2009).  
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profitable to offer credit to higher-risk individuals.19 Applications submitted 
through websites or from mail solicitations have exponentially grown and have 
largely replaced in-person meetings to apply for credit at a local bank.20 Such 
innovations necessarily introduce new risks, including identity theft and fraud.21 
Congress has enacted multiple statutes in response to such threats, including a 
statute that compels financial institutions to safeguard personal information or 
implement identity theft warning systems.22 In comparison, there has been little 
research on coerced debt, and even less on the potential regulatory framework, 
as well as credit card company policies relating to coerced debt.23 
Research has only recently begun to fully comprehend the consumer and 
credit dimensions of domestic violence.24 This article will argue that consumer 
protection statutes and financial institutions do not adequately protect domestic 
violence victims from coerced debt. Based on data that I collected after contacting 
twenty credit card companies to inquire into their domestic violence policies, I 
argue that domestic violence victims have been left behind in credit card 
regulation, consumer protection policy, and private enforcement. Part I of this 
article provides background on definitions of domestic violence and reviews 
recent empirical research into the prevalence of economic abuse and coerced 
debt. Part II of the article discusses changes in credit card issuing, and how those 
changes impact domestic violence victims. Part III describes the methodology 
and results of a qualitative study into the top twenty issuers of credit cards in the 
United States. Part IV compares the growth of the domestic violence movements 
with elder abuse movements to show that credit card issuers have responded to 
the needs of the elderly, but not domestic violence victims. This comparison will 
show that domestic violence survivors have been left behind in financial services 
regulation. Part V discusses potential options for future regulatory or private 
 
 19.  David A. Lander, “It ‘is’ the Best of Times, It ‘is’ the Worst of Times": A Short Essay on Consumer 
Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 204–05 (2004).  
 20.  See Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 
73 (2006) (“People who thirty years ago would not have been able to get an appointment to see a loan 
officer at a local bank can now get multiple offers for a home mortgage, an auto loan, or a credit card 
after filling out an application on the Internet.”); Kelly M. Miley, Electronic Banking, 15 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 2, 6–7, 9 (1996) (discussing how banking institutions, like Wells Fargo, rolled out online 
portals for products in 1995 and 1996, including “accepting credit card applications over the 
Internet”); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1420 (2004) (noting that over five 
billion solicitations were sent in one year in America).  
 21.  See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45, 45 
(2007) (“In 2006, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) measured reported consumer fraud losses in 
the United States at $1.1 billion, but this figure failed to account for undetected or unreported 
transactions.”).  
 22.  See Christine Daleiden, Identity Theft and Consumer Protection Under the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, 16 HAW. B.J. 4, 7–8 (2012) (“The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act . . . established 
numerous protections for consumers from identity theft. . . . FACTA also imposes numerous 
regulatory requirements on parties who maintain personal information about individuals: financial 
institutions, credit reporting agencies . . . .”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known 
Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 100 (2007) (noting that Congress defined identity theft in 
2007 by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1028).  
 23.  Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by 
Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 429 n.3 (2013) [hereinafter Littwin, Battered Credit] (“There 
are no other academic articles on coerced debt.”).  
 24.  See discussion infra Part I.B.  
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programs for responding to coerced debt. 
I. EMPIRICAL DATA ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & COERCED DEBT: 
A. Defining Domestic Violence and Coerced Debt 
Domestic violence is generally seen as involving “physical violence, sexual 
violence, stalking, and psychological aggression (including coercive tactics) by a 
current or former intimate partner.”25 That violence can take place “among 
cohabitating or noncohabitating . . . opposite or same-sex couples”26 and “does 
not require sexual intimacy.”27 In 2007, Evan Stark argued for a reframing of 
domestic violence in his seminal work, Coercive Control.28 Domestic abuse has 
commonly been associated with physical assault,29 and most media coverage of 
domestic violence focuses on this physical aspect.30 In contrast, Stark defines 
domestic abuse as “a course of calculated, malevolent conduct . . . interweaving 
repeated physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation, 
isolation, and control.”31 Stark argues that the “primary harm abusive men inflict 
is political, not physical, and reflects the deprivation of rights and resources that 
are critical to personhood and citizenship.”32 He considers each specific act of 
violence within “an ongoing and gender-specific pattern of coercive and 
controlling behaviors that causes a range of harm in addition to injury.”33 Stark’s 
theory offers a more holistic and sophisticated portrayal of domestic violence 
than one focusing primarily on physical abuse or even isolated incidents of 
physical abuse.34 
Researchers have continued to hone this coercive control theory by 
measuring specific behaviors that frequently accompany or are central to an 
abuser’s pattern of violence.35 The CDC defines coercive control as a form of 
 
 25.  MATTHEW J. BREIDING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES — 2010 7 
(2014), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cdc_nisvs_ipv_report_2013_v17_ 
single_a.pdf. I use the term domestic violence synonymously with the term intimate partner violence.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Intimate Partner Violence: Definitions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/intimatepartnerviolence/definitions.html (last updated Nov. 25, 
2014).  
 28.  STARK, supra note 5, at 3–6.  
 29.  In the 1990s, Lenore Walker also developed the cycle theory of violence, which identified 
three phases: “(1) tension building, (2) the acute battering incident, and (3) loving contrition.” Mia M. 
McFarlane, Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: An Inappropriate Response for New York Health 
Care Professionals, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1999). In this theory, the cycle revolves around 
moments of violence. Id. Ellen Pence developed the Power and Control Wheel, which theorized 
domestic violence as a pattern of behavior where other forms of abuse, like emotional and economic 
abuse, filled the periods between physical violence. Id. 
 30.  STARK, supra note 5, at 5.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 99–100.  
 34.  See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan Stark’s Coercive Control Into Legal 
Doctrine for Abused Women, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1458, 1459 (2009) [hereinafter Hanna, 
Paradox] (critiquing Evan Stark’s portrayal of domestic violence).  
 35.  See e.g., Adrienne E. Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE 
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psychological aggression that includes “behaviors that are intended to monitor, 
control, or threaten an intimate partner.”36 According to the CDC, one type of 
coercive control behavior includes economic abuse, defined as “behaviors that 
control a woman’s ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources.” 37 
Although the CDC considers economic abuse as a subset of psychological abuse, 
researchers now argue that economic abuse should be considered distinct from 
psychological abuse.38 They suggest economic abuse takes three unique forms: 
economic control, economic exploitation, and employment sabotage.39 Coerced 
debt is a specific form of economic abuse that involves “all nonconsensual, 
credit-related transactions that occur in a violent relationship, not just matters 
that depend on the express application of force.”40 Coerced debt spans both the 
economic control and economic exploitation categories of financial abuse.41 
Physical, sexual, and psychological abusive behaviors have all been widely 
researched, but financial abuse and economic control have only become a topic 
of study recently.42 
B. Measuring Coerced Debt 
According to the CDC, the lifetime prevalence of all forms of coercive 
control for women is 39.9%, and 40.4% for men.43 There has been little research 
on the prevalence of coerced debt and economic abuse,44 and such research has 
 
AGAINST WOMEN 563 (2008) (noting the difficulty of measuring economic abuse); Terri L. Weaver et 
al., Development and Preliminary Psychometric Evaluation of the Domestic Violence–Related Financial Issues 
Scale (DV-FI), 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 569 (2009) (utilizing an explanatory factor analysis to 
study domestic violence and related financial issues).  
 36.  MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL OF THE CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 
2010 SUMMARY REPORT 10 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs 
_report2010-a.pdf. It is important to note that 48.4% of lesbian women, 68.8% of bisexual women, and 
48.2% of bisexual men reported experiencing coercive control in their lifetime. MIKEL L. WALTERS ET 
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL OF THE CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 FINDINGS ON 
VICTIMIZATION BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION 23–24 (2013), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_SOfindings.pdf.  
 37.  Adams et al., supra note 35, at 563–66.  
 38.  Amanda Mathisen Stylianou et al., Measuring Abusive Behaviors: Is Economic Abuse a Unique 
Form of Abuse?, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3186, 3199–201 (2013).  
 39.  Id. at 3189. 
 40.  Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 954.  
 41.  Angela Littwin notes that research in economic coercive control behaviors identifies two 
categories, “preventing victims from earning money and controlling their access to money the family 
has earned,” and that coerced debt falls within the latter category. Littwin, Battered Credit, supra note 
23, at 374. However that conceptualization is a different theory than the three-pronged one used here.  
 42.  Stylianou et al., supra note 38, at 3197.  
 43.  Breiding, NIPSVS 2011, supra note 10, at 10.  
 44.  Stylianou et al., supra note 38, at 3187. The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, the leading 
study into consumer bankruptcy, asked consumer bankruptcy filers questions regarding domestic 
violence and demonstrated that domestic violence survivors are disproportionately represented in 
comparison to the general population. See Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 962–69. 
However, this study focused on physical and sexual violence experienced by bankruptcy filers and 
not coerced debt. See id. at 968–69 tbl.2 (listing questions asked to participants showing that these 
questions do not include issues of coerced debt). 
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only been preliminary.45 In a study by Michigan State University psychologists, 
researchers interviewed 103 women who received assistance from domestic 
abuse victim agencies in a Midwestern state46 and found that 99% of these 
women had experienced some type of economic abuse from their partners.47 The 
study developed the Scale of Economic Abuse (SEA), which asks domestic 
violence victims twenty-eight questions about specific actions taken by their 
abusive partners. For example, the SEA asked the victim how frequently their 
abuser would “[s]teal the car keys or take the car so you couldn’t go look for a 
job or go to a job interview” and “[t]hreaten you or beat you up for paying the 
bills or buying things that were needed.”48 The researcher grouped each question 
into two subscales: Economic Control and Economic Exploitation.49 Angela 
Littwin analyzed this study in her article, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer 
Credit in Domestic Violence, and identified eleven questions from the survey that 
affect whether a victim is able to pay off debt, have access to a credit card, or 
prevent the abuser’s use of the victim’s credit card.50 The questions involving 
credit- and non-credit-related behaviors were almost all grouped together into a 
single question, complicating the results for coerced debt.51 
In a second study of domestic abuse victims by Rutgers University 
researchers, 94.2% of the participants experienced some form of economic 
abuse.52 This study interviewed 120 women recruited from domestic violence 
programs across 10 states.53 This study used a Modified Scale of Economic 
Abuse, which reduced the SEA to twelve questions grouped into three 
categories: economic control, economic exploitative behaviors, and employment 
sabotage.54 Of the participants, 79% experienced economic exploitative 
behaviors, which included “[b]uild up debt under [their] name by doing things 
like us[ing] [their] credit card or run[ing] up the phone bill.” 55 Similarly, 79% 
experienced economic control, which included behaviors like “[k]eep[ing] 
financial information from [them].”56 Since this modified scale was based on the 
 
 45.  See Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 960 (“Like the original research presented in this 
Essay, the one previous study of coerced debt was preliminary.”). 
 46.  Adams et al., supra note 35 at 570–71.The women’s ages ranged from 18 to 85, and 48% of the 
women were African American, 45% white, 1% Asian, and 5% Hispanic/Latina. Id. at 571.  
 47.  Id. at 580.  
 48.  Id. at 58.   
 49.  Id. at 574.  
 50.  Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 960–61. 
 51.  See Adams et al., supra note 35, at 583 app. (including “[b]uild up debt under your name by 
doing things like use your credit card or run up the phone bill”); Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, 
at 960–61 (“The extent to which some of these items are measuring credit-related behavior is 
currently unclear.”).  
 52.  Judy L. Postmus, et al., Understanding Economic Abuse in the Lives of Survivors, 27 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 411, 419 (2012). 
 53.  Id. at 416. Specifically, the researchers only invited adults from these domestic violence 
programs who “had attended at least one individual or group session during which the economic 
empowerment curriculum information had been shared.” Id. The participants ranged from age 18 to 
73, and approximately 55% were white, 20% African American, 18% Latina/Hispanic, and 8% 
biracial, Native American or other racial identity. Id.  
 54.  Id. at 411.  
 55.  Id. at 411, 420.  
 56.  Id.  
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same scale in the Michigan State University study, the results pertaining to 
credit-related behaviors are similarly unclear.57 
The scholars on the forefront of this research admit that their collective 
knowledge of economic abuse “is still in its infancy”58 and that more studies are 
necessary to understand how the economic dimensions of abusive relationships 
prevent women from escaping.59 Nonetheless, the researchers conclude that such 
high percentages of women experiencing economic abuse indicates a “pressing 
need” for changes to state and federal policies to prohibit economic abuse and 
fund financial literacy programs.60 Considering the rise of credit card use, as 
discussed in the following Parts, more research is needed specifically on coerced 
debt, so that credit-related policies and interventions can better respond to the 
needs of domestic violence victims. 
II. WHY CREDIT CARDS MATTER FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
There are numerous barriers preventing domestic violence victims from 
breaking themselves out of the abusive cycle and remaining free. Factors include 
safety, inefficient law enforcement response, biases against domestic violence 
victims, economic dependence, and homelessness.61 Domestic violence survivors 
will often leave their relationships with damaged credit,62 loss of property, legal 
fees, medical bills, cost of new housing, and marred employment histories.63 
A primary reason that many women do not try to leave their abusers is that 
they lack the adequate material resources to do so.64 Inadequate material 
resources lead to a victim’s economic dependency on the abuser.65 Studies have 
 
 57.  See id. at 420 tbl.I (including as an item “[b]uild up debt under your name by doing things 
like use your credit card or run up phone bills”). For a 2013 study using the same scale, see Stylianou 
et al., supra note 38.  
 58.  Stylianou et al., supra note 38, at 3188.  
 59.  Id. at 3201.  
 60.  Id. at 3200.  
 61.  Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 356 (2014); see also Sarah M. Buel, A Lawyer's Understanding of Domestic 
Violence, 62 TEX. B.J. 936, 939 (1999) (citing as other factors “the batterer's stalking and sabotage of any 
steps toward independence” and “physical or mental disability, advanced age, homelessness, medical 
problems, no available shelter space, religious beliefs, extreme youth, or immigration status,” as well 
as “lack of money, job skills, affordable child care and housing”).  
 62.  Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 1001. 
 63.  See Michael A. Anderson et al., “Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?”: A Descriptive Study of Victim 
Reported Impediments to Her Safety, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 153 tbl.I. (2003) (listing the types of abuses 
leading to these types of outcomes, including physical abuse leading to hospital stays, and thus, 
medical bills); Sara J. Shoener & Erika A. Sussman, Economic Ripple Effect of IPV: Building Partnerships 
for Systemic Change, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 83, 84 fig.1 (Aug./Sept. 2013) (noting both the long- and 
short-term effects of leaving the relationship), available at http://www.csaj.org/document-
library/Shoener_and_Sussman_2013_-_Economic_Ripple_Effect_of_IPV.pdf ; 
Jamie Haar, Women's Work: Economic Security in the Domestic Violence Context, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 471, 481, 491 (2014) (citing lack of employment protections as a factor and “tax liability, consumer 
credit debt, loss of unemployment insurance, and lack of property rights” as consequences of 
domestic violence).  
 64.  See Adams et al., supra note 35, at 568 (“Studies have consistently identified economic 
dependence as a critical obstacle for many women who are attempting to leave abusive partners.”). 
 65.  Weaver et al., supra note 35, at 570. 
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shown that the level of economic dependency negatively correlates with the 
likelihood that the victim will leave the abuser.66 If the victim is financially 
dependent on an abuser, she may feel obliged to stay with her abuser and find it 
more difficult to press criminal charges or seek restraining orders.67 The 
relationship of domestic violence and financial insecurity is circular.68 Abusers 
control their victims’ access to material resources and cause financial instability, 
which increases the victims’ further susceptibility to violence and erects obstacles 
for them to escape to safety.69 
Coerced debt may lead to destroyed credit ratings, which in turn, makes 
creating a life liberated from the abuser even more difficult.70 Damaged credit 
obstructs the victim’s ability to secure the basic necessities for leaving the 
relationship, including housing, employment, and utilities, since landlords, 
employers, and utilities companies regularly consult credit scores to screen 
applicants.71 Consequently, damaged credit has led to “longer shelter stays, 
victims returning to their abusers, or victims making financial calculations that 
resulted in them not leaving their abusers in the first place.”72 Since coerced debt 
results in such daunting costs for its victims, researchers must better understand 
the mechanisms for how and why coerced debt can be so easily utilized as a form 
of abuse. 
A. How Has Credit Become a Weapon? 
Today, approximately 75% of American households own at least one credit 
card, which household maintaining an average of $7,400 in credit card debt.73 
Cardholders have roughly eight credit cards each.74 This was not always the case. 
Consumer lending did not constitute part of the portfolio of banks in America for 
most of the nation’s history.75 Diners Club created the first charge card in 1949,76 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id.; Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is Political and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 401 (2007); Angela M. Moore Parmley, Violence Against Women Post VAWA: 
Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1417, 1422 (2004). 
 68.  Shoener & Sussman, supra note 63 at 83.Although the lifetime prevalence of physical 
violence by an intimate partner is less than a third among women, approximately half of all women 
participating in Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) had experienced domestic violence. 
NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, SHORTCHANGING SURVIVORS: THE FAMILY VIOLENCE 
OPTION FOR TANF BENEFITS 5 (2009), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NLCHP_ 
ShortchangingSurvivorsTheFVOptionForTANFbeneftis_12-2009.pdf. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See Angela Littwin, Battered Credit, supra note 23, at 366 (“Coerced debt wreaks havoc on 
credit scores. Victims of coerced debt often do not discover the debt until they attempt to leave an 
abusive relationship, when much of the debt is delinquent or in danger of becoming so.”). 
 71.  Id. at 366–67.  
 72.  Id. at 367.  
 73.  Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 333–34 
(2014). 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Michael L. Starzec, The Legal History of Credit in Four Thousand Years (or Less), 26 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 107, 114 (2013). 
 76.  Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 
151, 159 (2013). Although charge cards were invented at this time, credit for consumption of goods 
has existed since antiquity. LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL 
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and banks began issuing credit cards in the late-1950s.77 After over twenty years 
of increasing numbers of credit cardholders, revolving credit still only accounted 
for 3.8% of total consumer credit outstanding in 1970.78 Usury laws in each state 
banned the extension of credit to higher-risk borrowers, restricting the pool of 
potential customers.79 
For multiple reasons,80 consumer lending to higher-risk customers became 
more profitable over time.81 One important turning point came in 1978 when the 
Supreme Court held that national banks could follow the interest rates permitted 
in the state where they were headquartered, which caused states to repeal usury 
laws and national banks to move to states with lenient rates.82 In 1996, the 
Supreme Court extended this rule to fees.83 As a result, credit card companies 
could raise interest rates, fees, and penalties, making lending to lower-income 
and riskier borrowers incredibly profitable.84 Subsequently, the secondary 
market became efficient, the supply of credit increased, and the demand for 
credit exploded.85 
Today, credit cards are abundant amongst even lower-income households.86 
For very low-income households, making less than $10,000 per year, credit card 
debt increased by 184% from 1989 to 2001.87 In 1989, 27.6% of households in the 
bottom 25% by net worth had credit card balances; by 2007, 41% had credit card 
balances.88 Another factor contributing to this increase was the easing of the 
application process – applications for credit cards can now be completed at home 
through online websites, telephone, or postal mail solicitations.89 In 2011, credit 
 
HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 17 (1999).  
 77.  Lander, supra note 19, at 204.  
 78.  Glenn B. Canner & Gregory Elliehausen, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Consumer Experiences with Credit Cards, 99 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2013/pdf/consumer-experiences-with-credit-cards-
201312.pdf. Revolving debt is primarily comprised of credit card debt. Id. 
 79.  Lander, supra note 19, at 204. 
 80.  See id. at 204–05 (discussing lenient usury laws, high inflation in the late 1970’s, legislative 
atmosphere, changes in legal precedent, Bankruptcy Reform Act, increased volume, oligopolization 
and consolidation of competitors into a handful of credit card lenders, sophistication in credit 
scoring). 
 81. Id. at 205. 
 82.  Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978); 
Freeman, supra note 76, at 159. 
 83.  Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Freeman, supra note 76, at 159–60; 
Lupica, supra note 18, at 581. 
 84.  See Lupica, supra note 18, at 580–82 (noting that low-risk, affluent, middle-class clients paid 
off their balances within the grace period resulting in less income from interest rates, so a shift to 
soliciting lower-income households who could not payoff debt in full would lead to increased 
profits). 
 85.  Lander, supra note 19, at 205.  
 86.  Lupica, supra note 18, at 583. 
 87.  TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE GROWTH 
OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE '90S 10 (2003), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet.pdf. 
 88.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 2013 SUMMARY OF CONSUMER FINANCES 
CHARTBOOK 1188 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/Bulletin 
Charts.pdf. The same percentage decreased after the recession to 33.4% of households in 2013. Id.  
 89.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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issuers sent nearly five billion direct mail solicitations, nearly 40% more than in 
2010.90 According to MasterCard Advisors, the professional services arm of 
MasterCard Worldwide, 52% of new credit card acquirers applied online, 18% by 
postal mail, 12% by mobile device, 8% by telephone, and 6% by other means.91 
Households who file for bankruptcy receive disproportionately more credit 
offers per month than the average household.92 
Greater availability of credit as well as home solicitation offers assist 
abusers in coercing their victims into coerced debt. 93 Angela Littwin explains 
that coerced debt is either achieved through fraud, force, or “misinformation and 
other means.” Coerced debt by fraud would include impersonation, forgery, and 
identity theft. By applying online, sending in a form via mail, or speaking to a 
representative over the phone, the abuser can create an account using the 
victim’s social security number and personal information.94 Littwin notes, “[T]he 
types of information that lenders currently require to prevent identity theft are 
only useful in screening out strangers, not intimate relations.”95 The abuser can 
also charge items to the victim’s accounts if the abuser knows the victim’s credit 
card and billing information. Coerced debt by force includes using threats of 
physical violence or other extremely negative consequences, like harming the 
victim’s children or reporting the victim for immigration-related violations.96 
Coerced debt by “misinformation and other means” is a sort of catch-all for 
behaviors that do not fit in the two prior categories. Examples include using 
language barriers to trick victims into signing documents, generating debt under 
a joint, married household knowing the victim will be liable, and destroying a 
victim’s property that is collateral for loans.97 
B. The Value of Credit Cards and Financial Freedom for Victim Safety 
Credit cards do not necessarily harm all domestic violence victims. In 
reality, credit cards can assist in providing a social safety net for domestic 
violence victims, especially when they first leave the abusive environment. 
Credit cards can serve to “enhance or maintain their productivity (e.g., to start a 
business, invest in an education, or subsist until new employment is found), to 
 
 90.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE 
PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/ccprofit2012.pdf.  
 91.  MARGOT VAUGHAN, MASTERCARD ADVISORS, HOW ISSUES CAN GET, KEEP, AND GROW THE 
OMNICHANNEL CUSTOMER 2 (2014), available at http://www.mastercardadvisors.com/campaign/ 
DMA2014/Responsive_Marketing_Whitepaper.pdf. 
 92.  Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry's Business Model for Postbankruptcy 
Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1393–94 (2008) (“The average bankrupt household in the sample 
reported receiving fifteen offers each month, 2.5 times the number directed to the average 
nonbankrupt family.”). 
 93.  See Littwin, Beyond Usury, supra note 17, at 453 (explaining the increased availability of credit 
over the past ten years). 
 94.  See Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 986 (“[B]anks used to require face-to-face meetings 
in order to authorize personal lines of credit. These meetings . . . limited the ways in which one 
person could fraudulently obtain a loan in the name of the other.”).  
 95.  Id. at 987.  
 96.  Id. at 989–90.  
 97.  Id. at 990–9.1 
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consume, and to provide a measure of income security or insurance in times of 
enhanced risk.”98 When a financial crisis hits, credit cards can be used to pay for 
necessities like food, shelter, or medicine.99 The three main reasons cited by 
bankruptcy filers as causes of their bankruptcy are job loss, medical illness, and 
divorce.100 Individuals can and often rely on their credit cards to “fill the gaps in 
the safety net to cover expenses when these sorts of financial calamities occur.”101 
Researchers have also shown that low-income families rely significantly on credit 
cards during times of unanticipated financial crisis.102 If a domestic violence 
victim’s credit has been destroyed due to coerced debt, that domestic violence 
victim has less liquidity to handle financial crises or to find financial freedom 
from her abuser.103 
III. SURVEY OF CREDIT CARD ISSUERS’ POLICIES FOR COERCED DEBT: DATA & 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the study was to survey credit card issuers’ policies for 
responding to coerced debt. This study consisted of phone interviews with 
customer service representatives from each of the top twenty issuers of credit 
card debt in the United States.104 
A. Subject Selection 
I consulted The Nilson Report, a payment-industry publication, for a list of 
the top credit card issuers. Although The Nilson Report uses proprietary 
information and does not generally disclose its sources,105 government 
agencies106 and numerous academics107 have relied on this source for statistics on 
 
 98.  Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the Social 
Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227 (2004). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS 
MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81 (2003). 
 101.  Jean Braucher, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke 
Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 193, 209 (2004) (book review). 
 102.  Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients 
and A Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 548–49 (2013) (finding that low-income families use 
credit cards for approximately 70% financial shock events in comparison to turning to families or 
friends, earned income tax credit, unemployment insurance, welfare, or private charities).  
 103.  Even beyond these financial shocks, credit cards support families during times of 
unexpected financial strain and even “cyclical borrowing” typical of “a consumer lifestyle” where a 
household’s expenses temporarily exceed revenues, like Christmas or the beginning of school terms. 
Austin, supra note 98, at 1227. 
 104.  Infra Part III.A. 
 105.  Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1, 58 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Priceless].  
 106.  See e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-225, CREDIT CARDS: MARKETING TO 
COLLEGE STUDENTS APPEARS TO HAVE DECLINED 3 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter GAO, CREDIT CARDS], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661121.pdf  (citing The Nilson Report as source for 
identifying the high volume of credit card issuances for purposes of the study); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS 
OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 6 n.8 (2014) [hereinafter BD. OF GOVERNORS, PROFITABILITY REPORT] 
(citing The Nilson Report as source for information on number of cards VISA, MasterCard, American 
Express, and Discover Card Services provided in 2013). 
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the American card industry. For instance, when the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) prepared a report for Congress on the marketing of 
credit cards to college students, the GAO relied on The Nilson Report to identify 
“the five largest general credit card issuers.”108 Ronald J. Mann, a Columbia Law 
School professor, and Adam J. Levitin, a Georgetown Law professor, are leading 
consumer law scholars, and both have relied on The Nilson Report to conduct 
their research on the payment industry.109 I followed their lead. 
According to The Nilson Report, the largest issuers of consumer Visa and 
MasterCard110 credit cards based on consumer purchase volume in 2013 were 
(ordered by their descending share of the market): JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, Citi, Capital One, U.S. Bank, Barclays, Wells Fargo, USAA, Cabela’s 
WFB, GE Capital Retail Bank,111 Navy FCU, PNC, First National Nebraska, TD 
Bank, Nordstrom, ICBA Bancard, Fifth Third, BB&T, State Farm, and Pentagon 
FCU.112 The top four companies, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citi, and 
 
 107.  According to a WestlawNext search, The Nilson Report had been cited in 64 law journal 
articles at the time of publication. See also, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the 
United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1108 (2002) (“I rely throughout this paper on the Nilson 
Report for statistics regarding the American card industry. Although the source of the statistics 
published in the Nilson Report is rarely clear, I follow the lead of American government agencies and 
earlier academics, which generally have accepted them as authoritative.”); Adam J. Levitin, The 
Antitrust Super Bowl: America's Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 271 tbls. 1 & 2 (2005) [hereinafter Levitin, Antitrust Super Bowl] (creating tables 
on U.S. transactions by payment method using The Nilson Report data); Michael S. Barr, Banking the 
Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 204 (2004) (“The Nilson Report predicts that debit card transactions will 
surpass credit card transactions in the next decade.”); Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit 
Card Interest Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 224 tbl. 2 (1986) (citing The Nilson Report for credit 
card issuers statistics in 1984).  
 108.  GAO, CREDIT CARDS, supra note 106, at 3 n. 7 .  
 109.  Mann, supra note 107, at 1108; Levitin, Antitrust Super Bowl, supra note 107, at 271.  
 110.  I chose to limit the survey to only issuers of Visa and MasterCard credit cards for multiple 
reasons. First, Visa and Mastercard-labeled cards constituted 432 million general purpose credit cards 
provided in 2013, dominating the majority of the market. BD. OF GOVERNORS, PROFITABILITY REPORT, 
supra note 106, at 6. Therefore, by including only these two networks’ issuers, this study will reflect 
the experience of a majority of credit card customers. Second, the system of credit card issuing, 
acquiring, and network associations is complex. Visa and MasterCard do not issue credit card 
accounts but instead rely on third-party banks and institutions to issue their cards to customers. 
Levitin, Priceless, supra note 105, at 1328. In contrast, American Express and Discover have historically 
issued their respective credit cards. Id. American Express and Discover have begun to contract with 
third-party banks, including Visa and MasterCard member banks, but both still issue a significant 
amount of cards on their own. Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of 
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 627, 663 (2006). The dynamics between customers, issuers, 
acquirers, and networks are intricate. Issuers can negotiate with networks and voice the collective 
concerns of their customers and merchants. Andrew P. Morriss &  Jason Korosec, Private Dispute 
Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 393, 429–30 
(2005). Since American Express and Discover are both issuers and networks, their behavior as  issuers 
may be different. To include American Express and Discover as issuers in this study is outside of this 
study’s scope and my level of expertise. For these reasons, I excluded American Express and Discover 
as issuers from this study.  
 111.  GE Capital Retail Bank is now named Synchrony Financial, but I will refer to it as GE 
Capital in this paper. Michael J. De La Merced, G.E. Files to Spin Off Retail Finance Unit, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/g-e-files-to-spin-off-retail-
finance-unit/?_r=0. 
 112.  HSN Consultants, Inc., Top U.S. Consumer Credit/Debit Issuers, THE NILSON REP., August 
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Capital One, issued the vast majority of credit cards in America.113 Surveying 
these companies alone would provide information on $856.5 billion of consumer 
purchase volume in 2013.114 Instead, I chose to survey the top twenty issuers of 
credit cards to compare results across a more diverse range of issuers, including 
nonprofit credit unions,115 retail store-affiliated banks,116 and a financial 
institution for military families.117 
B. Methodology and Data Collection 
The phone interviews loosely followed a script.118 I called each credit card 
issuer’s customer service number listed on their websites119 and told each 
representative that I was a domestic violence advocate who sought information 
on behalf of my domestic violence clients.120 In addition to asking about the 
company’s general policies for domestic violence, I asked what the protocol 
would be for two specific scenarios: (a) the first client, Client A, discovered that 
her abusive ex-partner had opened a credit card account in her name using her 
personal information without her knowledge, and (b) the second client, Client B, 
was forced to open a credit card account by her abusive ex-partner, and then the 
ex-partner charged a significant amount of debt on that account against her will. 
I chose these two scenarios to compare the reaction of representatives to coerced 
debt by fraud (Client A) and coerced debt by force (Client B) as defined by 
Angela Littwin.121 I called each company twice using the same script. 
As stated previously, the purpose of the study was to observe credit card 
issuers’ responses to coerced debt of their clients. I chose to interview credit card 
issuers’ customer service representatives, because this method would offer at 
least an initial glimpse into how credit card issuers train their representatives. 
Because individual representatives may not adequately portray the companies’ 
actual policies and protocols, this study was only introductory. Nonetheless, 
representatives’ responses may still carry informative and legal weight.122 I 
 
2014, at 1, 10 tbl. “Largest U.S. Issuers of Consumer Visa and Mastercard Cards 2013.”  
 113.  The amount of consumer purchase volume for JP Morgan Chase, $364.86 billion, is more 
than the total amount, $273.27 billion, that the sixteen credit card issuers ranked fifth to twentieth 
issued. Id. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Pentagon FCU. 
 116.  Nordstrom, Cabelas WFB. 
 117.  USAA. 
 118.  See infra app. A.   
 119.  For example, JP Morgan Chase bank lists one phone number on the Customer Service 
webpage for its credit card products. See Chase Credit Card Customer Service, J.P. MORGAN CHASE & 
CO., https://www.chase.com/credit-cards/customer-service (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). First 
National of Nebraska lists a specific number on its website for “Credit Card Customer Service.” See 
Contact Us, FIRST NAT’L BANK, https://www.firstnational.com/RetailWeb/default/contactus 
/SHOW_FORM/form (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). BB&T lists a phone number directly on its credit 
card-specific page. See Credit Cards from BB&T, BB&T, http://www.bbt.com/bbtdotcom/banking/ 
credit-cards/default.page (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 120.  The companies and customer service representatives were not notified that they were the 
subject of a study. 
 121.  Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 986–90.  
 122.  See John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law As A System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1627 (2010) 
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tracked the representatives’ responses, including whether their employees 
transferred me to a supervisor or legal department, provided detailed 
instructions for contesting coerced debt, or claimed that the company did not 
have a policy for responding to domestic violence. Since the topic of domestic 
violence may be offensive or traumatizing, I did not fabricate or discuss details 
involving physical violence, sexual abuse, or other disturbing issues. I sought to 
minimize any risk to the welfare of the subject customer service 
representatives.123 
C. Results124 
1.  Domestic Violence Policy or Protocol 
None of the representatives identified that their company had a written 
policy or protocol to respond to issues of domestic violence. On the first round of 
 
(“Likewise, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) . . . allows an employers' opponent to use 
employees' statements, when they were made during their employment and are about a matter 
within their employment's scope, against the employer.”); Felicia Ruth Reid, Ethical Limitations on 
Investigating Employment Discrimination Claims: The Prohibition on Ex Parte Contact with A Defendant's 
Employees, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1991) (“Since employment discrimination occurs in the 
workplace, fellow employees will be a plaintiff's major witnesses and will possess information crucial 
to her case.”). In the housing and lending discrimination context, nonprofits have hired individuals to 
test whether individual employees or agents of a landlord or lender would treat people of different 
backgrounds, including race, familial status, and so on, discriminately, and courts have continually 
approved of this testing to prove discrimination claims. Liam Garland, Reflections on Housing Rights 
Center v. Krug, 41 URB. LAW. 249, 249–56 (2009); Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage 
Lending Discrimination Cases, 41 URB. LAW. 319 (2009).  
 123.  The probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort of the representatives anticipated in 
the research are no greater than those ordinarily encountered in daily life. I did not record identifying 
information about the representatives. I only recorded the first name of representatives to ensure that 
I did not speak to the same individual on subsequent calls to the same company. Since the subject 
companies are large corporations, it is unlikely that a first name will be able to identify an individual 
if this information was released. I also did not record conversations on an audio or visual recording 
device for similar reasons. Instead, I transcribed the conversations during the interviews to the best of 
my ability and immediately reviewed my notes for errors after concluding the interview. 
 124.  On the first round of calls, representatives from two issuers, Barclays and ICBA Bancard, 
refused to speak with me even regarding general information. On the second round of calls, more 
representatives refused to speak to me, including GE Capital, First National Nebraska, US Bank and 
Bank of America. During the first round, the Barclays representative said he could only speak to me 
with formal authorization from the domestic violence victims. The Barclays representative told me to 
go to the company’s website for general questions. When I asked where on the website I should look, 
the Barclays representative immediately responded, “I need to speak to the cardholder to answer 
that.” The ICBA Bancard representatives on each round of calls claimed that they are “just the 
provider,” so the domestic violence victims should contact whatever bank is getting business from 
her credit card. According to the ICBA Bancard website, the company offers banks two credit card 
programs: (1) “Direct Issuing,” which permits banks to issue their own credit cards while ICBA 
Bancard offers “fraud protection, 24-hour customer service, a rewards program, and more”; and (2) 
“Total Card Management” program, where banks can offer ICBA Bancard’s cards “branded with 
your own, [the bank’s], logo” but through TCM Bank, N.A., a subsidiary bank of ICBA Bancard. 
Credit Card Solutions, ICBA BANCARD & TCM BANK, 
http://www.icbabancard.com/productservices/index.cfm?ItemNumber=54428&navItemNumber=5
3373 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); About TCM, Bank, N.A., ICBA BANCARD & TCM BANK,  
http://www.icbabancard.com/About/index.cfm?ItemNumber=53413&navItemNumber=53318 (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
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calls, thirteen representatives explicitly stated that no policy existed or that they 
were unaware of any such policy. Five representatives stated that their company 
had policies for credit card terms and conditions, identity theft, or fraud, but 
none of these policies explicitly mention domestic violence or coerced debt. On 
the second round of calls, twelve representatives explicitly stated that no policy 
existed or they were unaware of any policy. Six representatives refused to 
answer whether a policy existed or whether they knew or did not know of any 
policy. No representative directed me to a general credit card policy on terms 
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Table 1. Credit Card Issuers’ Domestic Violence-Specific Policies 
 






or that they did 
not know of one 
13 Chase, Bank of 
America, Citi, US 
Bank, Wells Fargo, 
USAA, Cabela’s WFB, 
GE Capital, Fifth 
Third, BB&T, State 
Farm, Pentagon FCU, 
Capital One 
12 Chase, Barclays, 
USAA, Cabela’s, Navy 
FCU, TD Bank, State 
Farm, Nordstrom, PNC, 






company had a 
domestic 
violence policy 
or whether they 
knew of any 
policy 
0  6 Bank of America, 
Capital One, US Bank, 
First National 






directed me to 











I did not ask if 
company had a 
domestic 
violence policy 
3 TD Bank, ICBA 
Bancard, Barclays 
2 GE Capital, ICBA 
Bancard 
 
2.  Options for Victims of Coerced Debt by Fraud or Force 
I received ranging and conflicting responses from representatives for what 
Clients A and B should expect upon calling to report their coerced debt issues.125 
Although Client A involved an individual opening an account using another 
person’s personal information, representatives identified Client A’s scenario in 
 
 125.  Certain representatives were resistant to answering questions. If a company is not 
mentioned in the results, then that company was not asked the pertinent question.  
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varied ways. On the first round of calls, five representatives identified Client A’s 
situation as identity theft, thirteen identified it as fraud, and two stated that there 
was no way for a client to dispute or that the client would be held responsible for 
the account’s activity. Capital One’s representative said it would likely be 
identity theft but it may also implicate fraud if the abuser used the same account 
to incur debt. On the second round of calls, multiple issuers’ representatives gave 
different answers from the initial round of calls. On the second round, three 
companies’ representatives identified Client A’s scenario as an identity theft 
claim, but none of these three companies are the same companies from the first 
round of calls. Similarly, twelve representatives identified Client A’s situation as 
a fraud claim, but four represent companies that had answered differently in the 
first round of calls. Most importantly though, two new companies’ 
representatives, BB&T and State Farm, stated that Client A could not dispute the 
account or would be held responsible for the account charges. BB&T and State 
Farm had previously stated during the first round that Client A could dispute 
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5 State Farm, PNC, 
Wells Fargo, 
Capital One, Bank 
of America 
3 USAA, Navy 
FCU, TD Bank 
Representative 
said Client A 
is/similar to 
fraud claim  
13 Chase, Citi, Capital 
One, US Bank, 




WFB, Fifth Third, 
BB&T, Nordstrom, 
GE Capital 
12 Chase, Citi, 









said Client A can 
dispute charges 
(but did not 
identify claim as 
fraud or identity 
theft) 








2 Barclays, ICBA 
Bancard 




said there is no 
way Client A can 
dispute or said 
she will be held 
responsible or 
put into a 
payment plan  
2 Pentagon FCU, 
Capital One  
2 BB&T, State 
Farm  
 
Responses to Client B were also inconsistent. In the first round of calls, two 
representatives identified Client B’s situation as identity theft, and eight 
considered it fraud. Five representatives stated that Client B can dispute charges 
on the account but did not identify the scenario as fraud or identity theft, and 
four said that the Client could not dispute the account or charges and would 
likely be held responsible.  In contrast, on the second round of calls ten 
representatives identified Client B’s situation as a fraud claim, one identified it as 
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an identity theft issue, and two representatives stated that Client B would be 
responsible for the account. 
Representatives that claimed that Client B will likely be held responsible 
ranged in how they discussed this point. During the first call to Fifth Third, the 
representative stated, “No, she’d be solely responsible. If you give someone 
permission to use your card you’ve given permission, so you are responsible. 
You’re the primary account holder.” The Fifth Third representative said fraud 
would not apply and that there were no exceptions for domestic violence 
victims. On the second call to BB&T, the representative discussed Client A and B 
together, saying “They are responsible. If it’s a BB&T card, they have to sign for 
it. If their name is on the account, then they had to sign for it, and they’re 
responsible.” When I asked what “sign for it means” and whether she means 
sign for each transaction or for the credit card application itself, the 
representative said both. I asked if an individual could apply for a card online, 
and the representative responded, “Yes, you can apply for a credit card online, 
but you have to sign electronically. So, even if it’s forced, she still gave 
authorization.” 
 
Table 3. Credit Card Issuers’ Responses to Coerced Debt by Force 
 













2 State Farm, Wells 
Fargo  
1 TD Bank  
Representative 
said Client B 
is/similar to 
fraud claim  




Navy FCU, GE 
Capital, TD Bank 









said Client B can 
dispute charges 
(but did not 
identify claim as 
fraud or identity 
theft) 




3 Cabela’s WFB, 
Fifth Third, 




whether Client B 
identity 
theft/fraud/can 
3 USAA, Barclays, 
ICBA Bancard 
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dispute 
Representative 
said there is no 
way Client B can 
dispute or said 
she will be held 
responsible or 
put into a 
payment plan 
4 Pentagon FCU, 
Fifth Third, 
Nordstrom, 
Capital One  
2 BB&T, State 
Farm 
 
3.  Police Involvement and Mandatory Reporting 
For both Clients A and B, policies regarding police involvement were also 
inconsistent across issuers and internally within companies as representatives 
shifted positions during calls. For the first round of calls regarding Client A, five 
representatives said that Client A would likely be required to file a police report 
if she wanted to challenge the account,126 four recommended that Client A file a 
police report but did not say it was required,127 and four said that the report was 
not required or especially recommended.128 Capital One’s representative gave 
inconsistent information. She explained that the company “cannot take so many 
actions unless the victim initiates a police report.” When I asked what would 
happen if Client A filed a police report, the representative said, “That’s different. 
We are the one who is going to take action on the person who committed theft. 
But I will be asking her.” I asked whether the company would intervene in the 
police report complaint, and the representative replied, “Sometimes it’s difficult 
to take action on the person who committed the theft. If she opens police report, 
she does not have to. The police can share the information. We cannot take 
action.” In comparison, JP Morgan Chase’s representative said the company may 
file a police report on its own without Client A’s consent. I asked if Client A can 
prevent the police from being involved, especially if she feared for her safety, 
and the representative said, “I can see the fear, but to protect her, we would 
pursue those charges– not her. . . I’ve seen that scenario play out. It’s 
unfortunate, but at the same time, from our standpoint, we want to help the 
person being victimized.” 
In the second round of calls, two representatives said that Client A would 
likely be required to file a police report if she wanted to challenge the account,129 
one recommended that Client A file a police report but did not say it was 
 
 126.  TD Bank, First National of Nebraska, Cabela’s WFB, and USAA. Citi’s representative said 
that a police report would be necessary if only a few numbers in her identification (i.e., social security 
number) were incorrect on the account application.  
 127.  State Farm, BB&T, Navy Federal Credit Union, and Bank of America.  
 128.  PNC, GE Capital, and Wells Fargo. Citi’s representatives said that if the fraudulent account’s 
application was opened with her personal information without any errors then she would not be 
required to file a police report.  
 129.  Wells Fargo and TD Bank.  
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required,130 and five said that the report was not required or especially 
recommended.131 By contrast, USAA and TD Bank’s representatives stated 
during the second round of calls that the company would file police charges 
against the abuser without discussing Client A’s consent. TD Bank’s 
representative explained, “If she doesn’t press charges, then TD will. . . . Police is 
going to be involved either way. If she don’t do it, it’ll be on her credit report. 
She’ll be held liable, and she’ll have to pay it off.” 
During the first round of calls, in Client B’s situation, three representatives 
said that Client B would be required to file a police report to challenge the 
account,132 three said that they would recommend but would not require Client B 
to report,133 and three did not indicate whether a police report was required or 
recommended.134 Citi and JP Morgan Chase representatives said that their 
companies may pursue police charges against the abuser without Client B’s 
consent. Citi’s representative explained that fees may shift to Client B for the cost 
of investigating her claim: 
[Citi] may also ask the law enforcement agencies to take some action. That will 
be done by Citibank. The customer will have nothing to do with this. . . . she will 
be kept in the loop throughout the investigation. She will be sent out a letter 
anytime something happens. So, if an investigation will be raised, then a letter 
will be sent out saying: ‘You asked us to investigate so and so issues.’ If the 
investigation results in her favor, she will not have to pay for anything. If 
otherwise, she may have to pay for that. But she can be sure that we will have 
documented proof of everything that we do. 
Lastly, two representatives would not provide an answer.135 
On the second round of calls, representatives from Wells Fargo and TD 
Bank said that Client B would likely be required to file a police report to contest 
the account, and three representatives recommended that Client B file a police 
report but did not say it was required by company policy.136 Finally, the same 
representatives, from USAA and TD Bank, that identified that their companies 
may file police reports without Client A’s consent applied the same rule in Client 
B’s situations as well. 
4.  Credit Card Representatives’ Emotional Responses to Domestic      
     Violence 
While most representatives remained neutral during the interviews, 
refraining from commenting on the domestic violence scenarios, some shared 
personal stories or expressed empathy or kindness towards Clients A and B.137 
During the first round of calls, a representative from one of the top four issuers138 
 
 130.  Chase.  
 131.  Capital One, Barclays, PNC, State Farm, and Nordstrom. 
 132.  State Farm, First National of Nebraska, and Cabela’s WFB.  
 133.  BB&T, Navy Federal Credit Union, and Bank of America.  
 134.  GE Capital, Wells Fargo, and Capital One. 
 135.  PNC and USAA. 
 136.  Chase, PNC, and Fifth Third.  
 137.  See Part C.3., supra.  
 138.  Since this may be more detrimental to the representatives, I will not name the 
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explained, “From personal experience, when it comes to things like that, I went 
to the police department. They kept an eye out for me and protected me. I would 
file a police report and see if there’s anything they can do to put a restraining 
order so that way they can be safe from any danger.” She also stated that talking 
about abusive relationships “can be embarrassing” and that she would be happy 
to talk to them because she is “not going to judge anybody.” Another 
representative from a top four issuer divulged, “Yeah, I mean, I have seen some 
of it in my own life – which is why I am trying to give you as much information 
as I can. So you know what to do going forward.” In addition, during the second 
round of calls, representatives from two other companies shared personal 
experiences. One representative stated, “When somebody’s been through that, 
it’s hard to know what to do. I do know more about that stuff, because it’s stuff 
that I’ve lived through so I know.” A representative from another company, 
while explaining that police reports may be problematic but necessary to free the 
clients from their debt, also stated, “I know DV is a touchy situation, I totally 
understand. I’ve been in that situation before.” 
In addition, some representatives recommended that Client A or B 
downplay their domestic violence stories when they contact the issuer 
companies. A representative from one of the top four issuers recommended that 
Client B not discuss the domestic violence issues when disputing her account 
activity. The representative said: 
[The issuer] may not give her a credit for the entire amount. We may say that we 
cannot dispute this charge, so ask her not to disclose everything. . . . they don’t 
need to know the entire story. . . . I understand what the situation is. As an 
organization, you also know, our company would not help people with these 
kinds of situations and these kinds of charges on this account. . . . You know the 
internal culture or organization’s mentality. 
Another representative from a top four issuer explained that the clients 
“don’t have to go in depth” when they make their initial call. 
On the second round of calls, two representatives shared similar sentiments. 
One representative from a top four issuer explained that, if the client does not 
want her abuser to be notified or charged with crime against her will, the client 
should not share details on the situations and just request that the account be 
closed. The representative stated, “I wouldn’t share information if they are just 
wanting to close the account if they don’t want police involved in it. . . . I would 
have to report.” A representative from a smaller institution stated that, when the 
clients call to dispute charges or open a fraud claim, they do not need to explain 
the situation. The representative said, “It can be done without a – why certain 
things happened. They can just file it as a dispute and we would go ahead and 
do that. They don’t have to say anything.” 
5. Elder Abuse Protocols 
The topic of elder financial abuse arose naturally in interviews. In both the 
first and second round of calls, Wells Fargo’s representatives explained that, if 
Client A or B is elderly, the company’s policy would be different since Wells 
 
representative’s company but will identify the issuers’ rank according to The Nilson Report. 
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Fargo has either “specific forms for elder abuse” or an abuse reporting protocol. 
At the end of the first conversation, I asked if he knew if Wells Fargo commonly 
received domestic abuse-related calls from customers. He said no, but he 
explained that it was “not uncommon” to find that “the person you’re talking to 
on the phone sounds like they are elderly, who might be getting taken advantage 
of.” He said that if he can tell that an elderly person is “being pushed,” then that 
is something Wells Fargo will respond to immediately. Capital One’s 
representative said similar comments. She explained, “We’re used to receiving 
elderly situations with elderly people. That’s handled in a different way. That’s 
pretty common.” 
Five days after my interview with the Bank of America representative, I 
received a call from a different Bank of America representative. She explained 
that she received “a report about financial abuse” and that her call was “in 
reference to an elder abuse report that you submitted for a client.” I explained 
that I did not indicate anytime during my conversation with the Bank of America 
representative that my clients were elderly and that I did not submit an elder 
abuse report. That representative stated that that is what she had received but 
that she would close the report. Although this conversation did not occur during 
my initial call, it nonetheless illustrates how the call was interpreted and 
responded to by the initial representative. 
D. Discussion 
Across the issues of identity theft, fraud, account disputes, police reports, 
and police intervention, the only consistent theme throughout the interviews was 
that there is no consistency across the top credit card issuers in responding to 
coerced debt. It is unclear whether the representatives’ responses were affected 
by discussions of domestic violence or whether these responses are generally 
how representatives respond to issues of identity theft and fraud. Further study 
is needed to compare how an issuer responds to individuals who do not identify 
as domestic violence victims and to  individuals who do, using otherwise 
identical stories for each individual. Furthermore, it is unknown whether the 
responses of each individual representative are indicative of the company’s 
general policy. Multiple series of this survey, or a similar survey, could be run on 
the same issuers to further investigate representatives’ responses.139 What is clear 
is that the representatives that discussed elder abuse and credit card issuer 
policies appeared to have clear directions, and even special forms, on how to 
respond to the issue of financial abuse and even credit card debt coerced by the 
elder’s relatives. More research is needed to understand whether domestic 
violence and elder abuse share any similarities, and if so, the benefits or 
challenges of integrating their models. 
 
 139.  Since a more extensive survey was not conducted , discussion of identity theft and fraud 
lack analytical foundation from these interviews.  
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IV. BACKGROUND AND COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ELDER ABUSE 
MOVEMENTS 
A. An Emphasis on Safety Versus an Emphasis on Finances 
The domestic violence movement did not emerge as a national movement 
until the late 1960s and 1970s.140 Domestic violence had not previously been 
recognized by the criminal justice system as a matter of concern.141 The early 
domestic violence movement distrusted the state, and instead, focused on 
providing services and shelter to victims outside of state involvement.142 
Advocates later committed to changing laws and policies, under the belief that it 
was necessary for systemic change.143 Advocates pushed for access to civil 
protection orders against abusers.144 From 1976 to 1992, all fifty states enacted 
legislation for civil protection orders.145 
While domestic violence advocates in the 1970s pursued a national 
organized effort and created shelters and other services for victims, elder abuse 
did not reach a national audience until 1981.146 In 1981, the United States House 
of Representatives Select Committee on Aging published a breakthrough report 
on elder abuse, defining the nature and extent of elder abuse.147 The report 
estimated that approximately one million elders were abused each year.148 
An important distinction between the early elder abuse and domestic 
violence movements is that the elder abuse movement initially saw financial 
abuse as its central issue. The aforementioned House Committee report 
explained that “[p]hysical violence including negligence [as] the most common 
form of abuse, followed by financial abuse”149 and that it “developed literally 
 
 140.  Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect 
Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 499, 500 (2003). See also McFarlane, supra note 29, 
at 5 (“It was not until the women's liberation movement in the late 1960's and 1970's that the problem 
of domestic violence began to receive adequate attention.”).  
 141.  Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence 
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (2004); McFarlane, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“In 1882, Maryland 
became the first state to criminalize wife abuse.”).  
 142.  Sack, supra note 141, at 1666 (2004); Murphy, supra note 140, at 500–01 (“[Advocates] saw the 
state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimizing male violence against women . . . Groups rejected 
governmental funding for battered women's services and programs.”). Police officers “frequently 
ignored domestic violence calls or purposefully delayed responding for several hours.” Joan Zorza, 
The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 
(1992).  
 143.  Sack, supra note 141 at 1667; Murphy, supra note 140 , at 500–02.  
 144.  Sack, supra note 141 at 1667. 
 145.  Murphy, supra note140, at 502.  
 146.  See Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect-the Legal 
Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 82–83 (1998) (highlighting a rise in public and professional  
recognition of abuse throughout the 1960s and 1970s).  
 147.  HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN 
PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981); Charles Pratt, Banks' Effectiveness at Reporting Financial Abuse of Elders: 
An Assessment and Recommendations for Improvements in California, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 195, 230 (2003); 
Moskowitz, supra note 146, at 83. 
 148.  Moskowitz, supra note 146, at 83.  
 149.  HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, supra note 147, at xv.  
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thousands of examples which [fell] into the category of financial exploitation.”150 
Unlike the studies on domestic violence, there have been numerous studies on 
the prevalence of elder financial exploitation since 1981.151 
The statutory definition of elder abuse varies in each state, but generally, 
elder abuse encompasses “neglect and physical, psychological, fiduciary, and 
sexual abuse or exploitation.”152 Financial abuse of an elder can include an array 
of conduct, including “‘fraud, false pretenses, embezzlement, conspiracy, 
forgery, falsifying records, coerced property transfers or denial of access to 
assets,’ as well as undue influence and abuse of fiduciary relationships.”153 
For over twenty years, banks have been identified as a “first line of defense” 
against financial exploitation of elders.154 Banks are able to identify unusual 
activity on an elder’s bank account, including sharp increases in debt or unusual 
spending patterns or sudden withdrawals.155 In the 1990s, Massachusetts created 
“the first major public/private partnership on a statewide level involving the 
banking industry.”156 This partnership enlisted 173 banks and published manuals 
for bank employees to identify, respond to, and thwart elder financial 
exploitation.157 This model has been replicated in several states.158 
States have also enacted statutes requiring bank employees to report elder 
financial abuse. Nine states have enacted reporting statutes that explicitly 
mention or require reporting by bank employees.159 Seventeen other states 
require reporting by any individual, but these states did not identify banks 
specifically.160 
 
 150.  Id. at 13.  
 151.  See John C. Craft, Preventing Power of Attorney Abuse-A Lawyer's Role, 75 ALA. LAW. 116, 118 
(2014) (“[E]lderly victims are not likely to report financial exploitation. Numerous studies have been 
conducted attempting to estimate the number of cases never reported to authorities.”).  
 152.  Clarissa Bryan, Beyond Bedsores: Investigating Suspicious Deaths, Self-Inflicted Injuries, and 
Science in a Coroner System, 7 NAELA  J. 199, 202 (Fall 2011).  
 153.  Jessica Coombs, Scamming the Elderly: An Increased Susceptibility to Financial Exploitation 
Within and Outside of the Family, 7 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 243, 245 (2014). Typically, relatives or caretakers 
perpetrate the abuse, but strangers sometimes commit it as well. Id. Examples include telemarketer 
scams, sweepstakes, disaster scams, and identity theft. Id.  
 154.  Pratt, supra note 147, at 229.  
 155.  Sandra L. Hughes, Can Bank Tellers Tell?-Legal Issues Related to Banks Reporting Financial Abuse 
of the Elderly, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 293, 294 (2004).  
 156.  Gillian Price & Craig Fox, The Massachusetts Bank Reporting Project: An Edge Against Elder 
Financial Exploitation, 8 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 59, 62–69 (1997).  
 157.  Id. at 65–66.  
 158.  See Hughes, supra note 155, at 303-04 (discussing similar projects in Oregon, California, and 
New York); see also James H. Pietsch, Elder Abuse and Laws to Protect Older Persons in Hawaii, 16 HAW. 
B.J. 93, 110 n.6 (2013) (discussing The Elder Justice Act, aimed at “ensuring adequate public-private 
infrastructure and resolving to prevent, detect, treat, understand, and intervene in, and where 
appropriate, aid in the prosecution of, elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation.”). 
 159.  See the following states’ statutes, mandating reporting by bank employees: Ark. Code Ann. § 
12-12-1708(a)–(c) (2013); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-1903(a)(1) (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.1034 (2003); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 30-5-4 (2002); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-1431 (2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-47-7 (2003); see also 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26-3.1-102 (2003) (urging but not mandating bank employees to report); Haw. Rev. 
Stat. § 346-224(a)(2) (2009) (“Employees or officers of any public or private agency or institution 
providing social, medical, hospital or mental health services, including financial assistance”).  
 160.  LORI STIEGEL & ELLEN KLEM, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS AND CITATIONS IN ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAWS, BY STATE (LAWS 
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B. Modeling Coerced Debt After Elder Financial Abuse? 
Despite the robust private and public response to financial abuse against 
elders, domestic violence and financial abuse have not received the same 
attention. Financial institutions’ identification, reporting, and prevention 
mechanisms for financial abuse have been in place for twenty years. Considering 
that policies, trainings, and institutional memory already exist for elder abuse, 
coerced debt implementation can follow a similar model.161 
Requiring mandatory reporting in the domestic violence context, similar to 
those already required in the elder abuse context, would incentivize credit card 
companies to properly train employees and create systems to prevent coerced 
debt. In addition, as demonstrated in the elder abuse context, mandatory 
reporting would assist in tracking the actual prevalence of coerced debt.162 This, 
in turn, may support more funding for better systems of prevention and support 
for victims.163 Lastly, there is “a public interest in prosecuting criminals,” and 
mandatory reporting helps the criminal justice system by identifying those 
criminals and likely developing evidence of the abuser’s criminal behavior that 
could later be used as evidence in prosecuting the abuser.164 
There are multiple arguments against mandatory response provisions for 
domestic violence. Sometimes it is reasonable for domestic violence victims to 
decide to stay.165 Victims often methodically develop long-term strategies to 
escape the pattern of abuse.166 Leaving a violent relationship requires 
consideration of complex issues, including securing future housing or shelter, 
protecting any children, saving funds, and planning police intervention.167 
 
CURRENT AS OF 12/31/06) (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/aging/docs/MandatoryReportingProvisionsChart.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 161.  See e.g., James P. Bessolo, Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Financial Elder Abuse, 30 L.A. 
LAWYER 23, 23–27 (Oct. 2007). Currently, elder financial exploitation mandatory reporting laws do 
not apply to domestic violence. See NANCY DURBOROW ET AL., THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION 
FUND, COMPENDIUM OF STATE STATUTES AND POLICIES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HEALTH CARE 2 
(2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/ default/files/fysb/state_compendium.pdf 
(“Mandatory reporting laws are distinct from elder abuse or vulnerable adult abuse and child abuse 
reporting laws.”). Domestic violence mandatory reporting provisions for domestic violence do not 
encompass banks or financial institutions. McFarlane, supra note 29, at 33–35.  
 162.  James T. R. Jones, Kentucky Tort Liability for Failure to Report Family Violence, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 
43, 60 (1999) (“Without obligatory reports there is significantly less information available for 
measuring this type of criminal activity [and if statistics show abuse is a major problem, society is 
much more likely to respond to it both with attention and adequate resources].”).  
 163.  After a mandatory reporting law for domestic violence victims and health practitioners was 
enacted in Kentucky, advocates attributed the state’s well-funded shelter system to that law. 
McFarlane, supra note 29, at 17–18.  
 164.  See id. at 33–34, 41 (explaining how mandatory reporting achieves these goals in the medical 
context).  
 165.  Id. at 22 (“When a woman makes a police report or seeks an order of protection, plans must 
be put in place to ensure her safety. Only the battered women fully understands her own particular 
situation, knows when and how she can be safe, and can decide when it is the right time to leave the 
relationship.”).   
 166.  See Virginia Daire, The Case Against Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence Injuries, 74 FLA. 
B.J. 78, 78–79 (2000) (examining mandatory reporting of domestic violence within the medical 
context).  
 167.  Id. 
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Mandatory reporting can alert the abuser to the victim’s intent to flee and force 
the victim into premature flight prior to her becoming financially able to protect 
herself from future serious bodily harm or homicide.168 If an abuser is alerted to a 
loss of control of the victim, research has shown that the abuser will escalate the 
abuse in response.169 Mandatory reporting may lead to victims’ refusal to report 
coerced debt out of fear of their own safety.170 The victim has the best 
information to evaluate what can be achieved based on the situation, including 
the potential risk of harm from the abuser.171 
CONCLUSION 
The abuse that domestic violence survivors must endure, and often 
overcome, is undoubtedly complex. However, by failing to fully understand 
coerced debt and other economic abuse tactics used by abusers, we limit 
domestic violence survivors’ opportunity to engage fully and equally in today’s 
modern economy and to build financial futures of consumer choice and long-
term planning. Most importantly, we implicitly condone certain acts of abuse as 
tolerable, because the harm they create, which we have not even measured fully, 
appears to pale in comparison to bruises or blows. In light of our new economy 
of credit, we must focus on (1) researching financial abuse to understand the 
problem, (2) creating incentives for financial institutions to properly monitor, 
prevent, and respond to domestic violence tactics, potentially through 
mandatory reporting, and (3) forming pathways for domestic violence survivors 
to find financial freedom, either through better regulatory frameworks, legal 
standards, or creation of financial literacy programs. 
  
 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  McFarlane, supra note 29, at 22 (“Many victims have been seriously injured or killed after 
police reports have been made or orders of protection have been sought.”).  
 170.  Daire, supra note 166, at 79–80.  
 171.  Id.  
Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  7:50 PM 




Hi, my name is Chris Kim. I work at a nonprofit organization in Durham, 
NC, where I help domestic violence survivors. Do you have a moment to help 
me understand what my clients should do regarding credit card problems 
they’re having as a result of their ex-partners? 
I have one client whose abuser opened a credit card account with your 
company account in her name using her social security number without her 
knowledge. 
How can she contest being liable for that account? 
What is the process? 
Will she need to file a police report to contest the account? 
If a police report is required, does she have any other option other than 
filing a police report? 
If she does not file a police report, will the company file a police report and 
pursue charges on your own? 
If she does file a police report, will your company intervene and be involved 
in pursuing charges? 
Will she be liable for that account and charges made to that account? 
I have a second client whose abuser threatened to hurt her if she refused to 
open a credit card account in her name and give full access to the credit card 
account to the abuser. Out of fear, she agreed, and her abuser charged a 
significant amount on the account but refuses to pay. 
How can she contest being liable for that account? 
Can she contest being liable for those charges? 
What is the process for contesting? 
Will she need to file a police report to contest the account? 
If a police report is required, does she have any other option other than 
filing a police report? 
If she does not file a police report, will the company file a police report and 
pursue charges on your own? 
If she does file a police report, will your company intervene and be involved 
in pursuing charges? 
Will she be liable for that account and charges made to that account? 
For either client, will their abusers be alerted to the fact that they have 
reached out to try to close the account? 
How do you verify that someone is attempting to close the account? 
For either client where your company will pursue charges, will my client be 
charged for the cost of that investigation? 
Do you have a written policy for these issues? 
Do you have a written policy for fraud/identity theft? 
Do you have a written policy or protocol for domestic violence specifically? 
Where can I find a copy of your policies? On your website? 
Is domestic violence a frequent problem that you encounter? 
Have you ever dealt with a domestic violence situation before? 
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Do you have other similar programs? 
Do you have an elder abuse protocol or policy? 
What was your name again? What department? 
Thank employee for his or her time. 
 
